2024Cambridge University Press · Book
2024with Luis C. Corchón and Yosuke Yasuda
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 112
2022Economic Theory, 74(4)
2020with Luis C. Corchón and Yosuke Yasuda
RAND Journal of Economics, 51(1), 279–300
2018Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 89(1), 87–107
2017with Luis C. Corchón and Antonio Romero-Medina
Social Choice and Welfare, 49, 735–753
2017Mathematical Social Sciences, 90, 182–190
2016The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 16(1), 217–241
2015Economics Letters, 137, 32–35
2015with Salvador Barberà and Clara Ponsatí
Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 237–257
2015Theory and Decision, 78(3), 377–398
2013International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 297–306
2010Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 469–487
2010International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1), 209–222
2009Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(5), 773–796
2009Mathematical Social Sciences, 57(2), 143–154
2009The Political Economy of Democracy, Fundación BBVA · Book chapter
2006The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 6(1), 1–29
2006Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), 185–200
2003with Luis C. Corchón and Simon Wilkie
Review of Economic Design, 7, 429–442
2002Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), 263–277
2002with Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(2), 321–340
1999with Martine Quinzii and José A. Silva-Reus
Mathematical Social Sciences, 37(1), 1–23
1998Review of Economic Design, 3(3), 195–213
1996Mathematical Social Sciences, 32(2), 125–137
1996Economics Letters, 50(1), 91–97
1996Social Choice and Welfare, 13(1), 113–126
1995Economic Theory, 6(2), 365–371
1990with Juan Vicente Llinares, Victoria Romero and Teresa Rubio
Revista Española de Economía, 7(2), 207–227
Meritocracy, incentives and stable organizations
How should cooperative organizations reward individual contributions?
Meritocracy can strengthen incentives, increase output and promote human-capital accumulation, but more meritocracy is not always socially desirable. Excessive reliance on performance may induce too much effort, encourage sabotage or lead workers to vote for reward schemes that benefit them individually but are inefficient. Organizational stability also depends on whether members can commit to a distribution rule; nevertheless, stable structures may accommodate both meritocratic and egalitarian groups.
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Majority voting and group formation
Can collective decisions be supported by the people who are directly affected by them?
Collective-choice rules can sometimes combine efficiency, majority support and stability. In the allocation of public facilities, it is possible to choose locations and assign users so that the selected location is supported by its users and no individual wishes to move to another group. More generally, collective decisions can be designed so that each component is ratified by the group of citizens directly concerned with it.
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Fair allocation with indivisible goods
Which principles of fairness survive when goods cannot be divided or when the population changes?
Many classical fairness results become fragile when individuals may receive several indivisible goods. In general, efficiency and population monotonicity cannot always be achieved simultaneously. However, positive results can be recovered in particular environments—for example, when there is only one indivisible good or when preferences satisfy appropriate substitutability conditions.
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